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Korea Divided: The Best Way Forward
Simon Gonsalves

I. Introduction
In 1993, Bill Clinton visited the Republic of Korea as part of his tour of
Northeast Asia. As President Clinton was looking across the Demilitarized Zone,
he described the terrain he saw as one of the scariest places on Earth (William
i). Since then, the Korean Peninsula has become even more perilous, and the
reunification of North and South Korea seems as far away as ever. However
opaque the future may be, it is still important to analyze the question of Korean
reunification, as the international ramifications of a single Korea are not to be
underestimated. This essay examines the circumstances under which the northern
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the southern Republic of
Korea (ROK) could be reunified under a single government.
The most likely scenario for the unification of the Korean peninsula
would be the internal collapse of the North Korean state and its subsequent
occupation by the ROK. This argument is organized into three parts. The first
section recounts the history of Korea’s separation. This section discusses the
attempts at political amalgamation within both countries from the 1950–1953
conflict onward. The next section outlines potential scenarios for unification
and summarizes the most probable way reunification might be accomplished.
The final section evaluates the potential fallout reunification would cause from
both a Korean and an international perspective. Throughout the paper, historical
examples will offer comparisons to recent history. These sub-topics provide
real-world examples that relate to a potential Korean reunification. Historical
appraisals are important because they apply the lessons of history to help make
sense of the complicated questions regarding the unification of Korea.
It is important to note that the DPRK is one of the most closed societies
in the world and does not publish reliable statistics. This scarcity of statistics
makes analysis of North Korea’s political and economic systems difficult (“South
Korea vs. North Korea”). Specifics regarding the DPRK are far from infallible,
and at times even the most precise statistics are closer to educated guesses than
facts. The DPRK’s isolationist and secretive nature creates an environment
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where the country’s internal affairs are kept secret and little information escapes
to the outside world. Consequently, the ideas argued throughout this paper
are advanced with a lack of a North Korean perspective and situation clarity,
something that may prevent a complete picture of a plausible reunification from
being conveyed. However, the evidence that is available through South Korea,
international sources, and historical comparisons will be utilized to mitigate the
hindrances of the DPRK’s closed society.
II. History of Korea’s Separation
To understand the modern Korean peninsula and the seemingly
permanent hostility between the North and the South, it is vital to understand
how the ROK and the DPRK drifted so far apart. Koreans share millennia of
common history and are one of the most homogenous peoples on the globe
(William 3). Considering Koreans share the same ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
background, what are the factors that divided the nation in half and caused the
current state of mutual hostility?
Ever since the first united Korean kingdom was founded in AD 688,
foreign powers have competed for influence and control over the country
(Hoare and Pares 19). One authority on Korean history estimates that there have
been more than 900 invasions of Korea over the past 2000 years (William 1).
Since the mid-nineteenth century, China, Japan, Russia, and the West have all
fought for control over Korea. Korea is located in the centre of this “strategic
quadrangle,” and each of the regional powers has historically considered Korea
to be within its sphere of influence (Lee 4). Therefore, throughout its history
Korea has borne the consequences of the hegemonic struggles between great
powers. While never truly sovereign because of its geopolitical location, Korea
was always territorially united. That changed decisively at the end of WWII.
During the final weeks of WWII, the Soviet Union (USSR) and the
United States (US) pushed into Korea to remove the occupying Japanese. The
border for the respective occupation zones was drawn along the 38th parallel
by the two victorious powers. At the Cairo Conference on November 22, 1943,
it was agreed that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent”
(William 12). However, the rapid decline of Soviet-American relations
ruined any chance of a timely unification of Korea by peaceful means. The
intensification of the Cold War in 1946–1947 stalled attempts at creating a
united, democratic Korea. Because no agreement could be reached between the
two superpowers, the Americans installed Syngman Rhee to govern the southern
Korean territory. A former Korean exile living in the United States, Rhee was a
Princeton graduate known for his hard-line anti-communist views (48). To lead
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the new Communist regime in the north, the Soviets eventually settled on Kim
il Sung. A former communist resistance fighter, Kim il Sung served in the Red
Army during WWII (11). Separate elections were held in the new Korean states
in 1948 to legitimize each power’s chosen representative.
A fanatical nationalist, Kim il Sung could not bear what he saw as the
permanent division of Korea, so he invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950,
in order to unite Korea under communist rule. After the United Nations (UN)
“Police Action” pushed the invading North Koreans out of the South, the UN
gave approval to “achieve the establishment of a unified, independent democratic
government in the sovereign state of Korea” (14) However, as the UN forces
pushed northwards towards the Chinese border, the Chinese intervened on behalf
of the DPRK. UN forces were pushed back to the 38th parallel, where the border
was permanently agreed upon by North Korea, China, and the United Nations in
1953. No formal peace treaty has since been negotiated between the ROK and
DPRK (14). U.S. General Mark Clark observed at the signing of the armistice
that the war had not resulted in military victory for either side but “instead
resulted in an uneasy peace with no prospect of a definitive settlement of the
Korean question” (Clark qtd. in Lewis 160).
III. Strategies for Reunification
The problem of Korean reunification is incredibly complex. Re-joining
one of the world’s most dynamic and developed economies with one of its most
dishevelled and repressive is no easy matter. The cultural, political, and, above
all, economic gulf between North and South are now so great that many experts
believe reunification is almost inconceivable. It has been nearly seven decades
since the Korean peninsula was divided, and much of that history has been
characterized by conflict and tension. However, reunification can come about in
one of three ways: mutual reconciliation, war, or internal regime collapse. This
paper will only examine the issue from the South Korean perspective because
North Korea’s perspectives on reunification are impossible to identify due to the
totalitarian nature of the regime.
The scenario the ROK sees as the most optimal is a “soft landing”
(Terry 154). In this scenario, the North Korean regime would adopt the
Chinese economic model, abandon militarism, and work towards a gradual
rapprochement with South Korea. This approach was the ROK’s policy towards
the DPRK from 1998 to 2007 because it is the most peaceful and economical of
the three possibilities. This path is best exemplified by South Korea’s ‘Sunshine’
foreign policy towards the DPRK that began in 1998 and lasted until 2008 (Jung
and Rector 488). The main goal of the Sunshine policy was to soften North

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016

3

Laurier Undergraduate Journal of the Arts, Vol. 3 [2016], Art. 5

GONSALVES

84

Korea’s behaviour towards the ROK by “encouraging interaction and economic
assistance” (Jung and Rector 492) The goal was to incite reforms within North
Korea, improve relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, and create goodwill
between the people of the ROK and the DPRK (494). Unfortunately, the
Sunshine policy was deemed a failure in 2010 by the South Korean Unification
Ministry. The ministry statement declared that the “billions of dollars and crossborder exchanges failed to change the mindset of Pyongyang” (Yong). This
failure epitomizes the consequences of all the other attempts made by the ROK
to unilaterally provide aid to the DPRK in return for a calming of tensions (Lee
4). The Kim Dynasty has shown no interest in serious reform and uses South
Korean aid and capital to stabilize its rule, providing nothing in return. During
the Sunshine Period, North Korea fully established its nuclear program and
tested its first device in 2006. The nuclear of the DPRK testifies to the naivete
of the ROK government’s belief in a peaceful merger of the two states (William
85).The failure of the Sunshine policy and the DPRK’s progressive shift towards
continued militaristic actions illustrates that a scenario involving a ‘soft landing’
reunification is not realistic.
Many South Koreans who favour the ‘soft landing’ approach look
to German history for inspiration. In early 2015, South Korean President
Park Geun-hye gave a major pro-unification speech in Germany, a highly
symbolic destination choice (Yong). Since its unification, Germany has made
great progress and is now among the most dominant and robust economics
in Europe, an ideal end result for Korea’s reunification. Both nations were
divided artificially by Cold War politics and split along the capitalist/communist
ideological line. Both the Federal Republic of Germany (FGR) and the ROK
eventually became healthy, functioning democracies with successful economies,
while the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the DPRK became
authoritarian states whose planned economies failed. In addition, the FGR and
the ROK maintained difficult relationships with their communist neighbours
throughout their histories. While on the surface there seem to be many parallels
between Germany and the current situation in Korea, there are also many
profound differences.
A deeper analysis reveals the disparities between the two situations due
to the profoundly different relationships the GDR and the DPRK have with their
respective international benefactors. No state has the same degree of influence
over the DPRK that the USSR had over the GDR (Lee 21). The GDR was a
satellite state of the USSR. Thus, when Gorbachev decided to approve the
reunification of Germany, the fate of the GDR was sealed. The DPRK, on the
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other hand, is a state intent on defending its sovereignty, and China’s influence
over the DPRK has been not been substantial enough to direct policy. North
Korea has openly flouted China in the past and has expressed a willingness
to do what it sees as best for national interests regardless of what the Chinese
government thinks. For example, China’s foreign minister denounced North
Korean nuclear tests in October 2006, and China’s stance has remained largely
unchanged since (“China resolutely opposes DPRK’s nuclear tests”). The fact
that the North Korean nuclear program persists to this day, despite Chinese
opposition, shows that China’s stance on the issue obviously has no effect on
the DPRK, illustrating that the DPRK will not be pressured by outside forces
on issues of national importance. Furthermore, Germany did not experience
a civil war that resulted in millions of casualties, unlike Korea. The lack of a
military conflict between Germans made the populations of the GDR and FGR
less hostile to each other and more accepting of reunification. Both the GDR and
the FGR maintained a working relationship that lacked the destructive border
clashes that occur regularly between the ROK and the DPRK (Rhee 372). For
example, there was no conflict between the GDR and the FGR comparable to the
bombardment of Yeonpyeong, the infamous artillery engagement between the
North Korean military and South Korean forces stationed on Yeonpyeong Island
on November 23, 2010. North Korean forces fired artillery shells and rockets
into South Korean territories, hitting both military and civilian targets, furthering
the tensions between the ROK and DPRK (“North Korean artillery hits South
Korean island”). The peaceful scenario that brought about German unification is
not present in Korea, and thus the event is not an accurate historical comparison
for Korean unification.
The second scenario, military conquest, is also improbable. The ROK
no longer stands by the slogan it maintained until 1960, “March North and
Unify.” (Research Center for Peace and Unification 70). Current popular opinion
in South Korea is, in fact, overwhelmingly against a first strike by the ROK
military against the DPRK. Regardless, South Korea is bound by the ROK-U.S.
Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT), which forbids an unprovoked South Korean
strike on the North (69). Additionally, while the DPRK may be militaristic, it
is not suicidal. The probability that a DPRK assault and total war on the ROK
would end in success is minuscule, especially considering the protection the
ROK receives from America (William 18). The combined forces of the ROK
and American militaries would almost certainly triumph over the antiquated
conscript armies of the DPRK, a fact that would be understood by DPRK
military planners. Because of this imbalance, it is unlikely that military force
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alone could result in unification.
Furthermore, one of the most powerful arguments against a Korean war
over reunification is the existence of the DPRK’s potent nuclear arsenal. North
Korea has developed and detonated nuclear as well as chemical/biological
weapons and has tested missiles that may be capable of delivering both at a
distance. These weapons act as a force equalizer between the DPRK and ROK
and its allies (72). The DPRK also maintains large amounts of conventional
artillery within range of major South Korean urban centres. In particular, the
DPRK is capable of bombarding the ROK capital, Seoul, which contains both
a quarter of the country’s population and the military’s command and control
headquarters (Lee 21). While the DPRK would never win a war against the
ROK, The DPRK would likely use its substantial firepower to attack Seoul and
other major cities with overwhelming force, seeking to do as much damage as
possible. A Korean unification through the conquest of the DPRK would likely
be a pyrrhic victory for the ROK. North Korea could inflict such a heavy toll on
the South that it would negates any sense of achievement or profit. It is in the
interests of both the ROK and the DPRK to avoid total war at all costs.
The most likely scenario for reunification is the breakdown of North
Korea’s government and society, known as a ‘hard landing (William 80). In
this case, the DPRK would implode under economic and social forces and
be absorbed by South Korea. This implosion could perhaps be triggered by a
rebellion, natural disaster, or assassination. A “hard landing” represents the only
real prospect for reunification. The ideological rigidity of the DPRK has set
the regime on a path of unrelenting totalitarian control resulting in catastrophic
consequences for the state. This is because the DPRK and the Kim Dynasty’s
claim to legitimacy relies on the ideology of Juche. This cornerstone of the North
Korean state is a combination of Korean ultra-nationalism, a strong sense of
national self-reliance, and traditional Marxist-Leninist principles (William 18).
The regime’s connection to the flawed command economy and protectionist
policies upheld in Juche makes it difficult for the DPRK to initiate the necessary
reforms the country needs to survive long term. Because it derives its legitimacy
from Juche, as well as the cult of personality surrounding the ultra-nationalist
Kim Dynasty, the regime would undermine the basis of its support if it were to
follow the Chinese example and open the country to significant foreign trade and
investment.
In spite of this pessimistic economic forecast, the DPRK, with the
exception of mostly cosmetic minor reforms, clings to the status quo (Delury
and Moon). This position, however, is growing increasingly untenable. The
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North Korean economy collapsed in the late 1990’s and suffers from severe
shortages of most necessary items (William 68). This collapse has led to
numerous famines, droughts, and an economy that cannot meet its citizens’ basic
needs. In addition, China, North Korea’s single economic backer, has shown
signs that its patience with the DPRK is diminishing. Recently, criticism of the
DPRK has become common in Chinese state-controlled media (Perlez). China’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly criticized North Korea’s 2016 nuclear
test, saying Beijing “firmly opposes” the DPRK’s actions (Jiha). This public
statement underscores Beijing’s deepening dissatisfaction with Pyongyang as
well as the deteriorating ties between the two allies. Since China provides North
Korea with most of its food and energy supplies, a waning of Chinese support
would be devastating to the DPRK. Additionally, the regime’s control over
information is much weaker than it was twenty years ago. Through black market
trade across the Chinese border, North Koreans are increasingly aware of North
Korea’s poverty and the relative prosperity of China and South Korea (Fuqua
137). These factors all contribute to the idea that the DPRK is prime for internal
collapse, furthering the plausibility of a “hard landing” reunification
On the other hand, academics and experts who have predicted the
DPRK’s imminent downfall have been consistently proven wrong. The idea that
the regime in North Korea “stands on the brink of extinction dates back decades”
(Delury and Moon). Regime collapse is difficult to predict accurately, especially
since the DPRK’s coercive and repressive tactics have proven very effective
at maintaining the regime’s control over the population (Hoare and Pares
43). However, as a comparison, most ‘experts’ on the GDR and the Warsaw
Pact had no inkling that the end of the Cold War was imminent. In Korea:
Enduring Division, D. S. Lewis predicted in 1988 that German unification was
unlikely. He wrote that “the presence of the Soviet Union and its watchful eye
on developments that might lead to unification renders it improbable that the
extension of mutual tolerance between the two Germanys will extend beyond
a certain point” (157) Within a year, the Berlin Wall had come crashing down
and the U.S.S.R. had given its approval for steps to be taken towards unification
through the 2 + 4 agreements (Rhee 365). By the end of 1990, Germany was a
united nation for the first time in fourty-five years. Thus, academics and experts
on North Korea, just as with the GDR, might be wrong in their predictions and
should not be discredited due to past incorrect deductions.
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IV. International Implications
In recent years, tensions across East Asia have increased. The rise of
nationalism across the region, China’s increasing assertiveness and power,
Japan’s movement away from its adopted pacifist identity, and ambivalence
towards America’s long-term commitment in the region have all contributed
to this unease (Lewis 146). In this era of heightened tensions and strained
relationships, the amalgamation of both halves of Korea would send shock
waves throughout the region. A unified Korea could have great implications for
the balance of power, with South Korea already considered by many a regional
power. While unification might pose some short-term challenges for Korea on
the international stage, in the long term, the end of the Kim Regime in North
Korea would be in the best interests of all concerned parties.
China is one country which has traditionally been viewed as an opponent
of Korean unification. The Chinese government believes its geopolitical situation
would be significantly weakened by the collapse of the DPRK. Because China
has few allies in East Asia, the potential absorption of the DPRK by the ROK
could be considered a blow to China’s national security, as The DPRK’s presence
as an ally helps to solidify China’s position as a regional power. Furthermore, the
collapse of the DPRK would bring about a military intervention that would bring
South Korean and American forces to China’s border. Having an Americanaligned power on its doorstep in an era of perceived American encirclement and
containment might be seen as a the problem for the Chinese (Terry 155). Yet,
the replacement of the DPRK might also bring China strong advantages. China
would no longer have to prop up the DPRK through transfers of fuel, food, and
other goods (Terry 158). Instead, it could provide real investments to the former
DPRK that would come with profitable returns instead of a capital drain. This
investment would also give China a public relations victory in the eyes of the
world, something the country sorely needs as many East Asian nations grow
increasingly suspicious of Chinese motives and ambitions. By contributing
towards the rebuilding of North Korea through aid, investment, and expertise,
China’s prestige would greatly improve in a region that views the country with
suspicion.
South Korea’s strongest allies would also likely see problems with the
unification of Korea. Both the United States and Japan would “fear the regional
chaos and instability that regime change would bring” (Terry 156). In particular,
both countries are concerned about North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons. Experts believe that the DPRK may have between five and
twelve nuclear weapons (William 85). With the dismantling of the North Korean
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regime, there would be an increased risk that this nuclear arsenal could fall into
the wrong hands, causing a security nightmare in an age of global terrorism.
However, if these weapons were dealt with quickly and efficiently and North
Korea’s military of 1.2 million active personnel demobilized properly, then the
risk could be minimized to acceptable levels (Fuqua 87).
Furthermore, Japan might feel threatened by the potential strength of a
united Korea. According to a 2009 report by Goldman Sachs, within thirty to
forty years, a reunited Korea could overtake Japan in terms of GDP (Terry 160).
However, assisting with the fallout of reunification would give Tokyo a great
opening to dispel the anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans that has lingered
since the days of Japanese occupation (William 7). In addition, America might
fear that a stronger Korea would be more independent and, consequently, lessen
America influence in the region (Lee 21). However, ending the long-term threat
the DPRK poses as Northeast Asia’s primary source of instability would be
worth the potential drawbacks.
The country most affected by reunification would undoubtedly be South
Korea. Many South Koreans fear the economic cost that would accompany
reunification. An advisory body appointed by South Korean President Lee
Myung-bak in 2011 put the price tag of reunification at over two trillion dollars.
Most current economic predictions state that reunification would cost the ROK
up to seven percent of the country’s annual gross national product (GDP) for
a decade (Phillips). The costs of integrating an isolated, impoverished, and
brainwashed population of twenty-five million into the modern world would be
extremely challenging (“North Korea vs. South Korea”). Updating an economy
that is one of the world’s worst is not an easy feat, as many South Korean elites
have learned from the German experience. North Korea’s GDP is estimated to be
around $40 billion and its per capita GDP ranks as one of the lowest worldwide
at only $1,800 (Jung and Rector 488). In contrast, South Korea currently has the
world’s thirteenth largest economy, worth $1.849 trillion and a per capita GDP of
$35,485 (488). The gap between the two countries is astronomical. As a result, a
large portion of South Koreans grew up in affluence and fear that their standard
of living would fall if the DPRK joins with the South. Concerns over tax
increases, budget deficits, international loans, and refugees have caused many
South Koreans to give up on reunification.
While the immediate issues facing South Korea would be serious, if
handled correctly, reunification would be desirable in the long term. From a
security perspective, South Korea would no longer have to be concerned about
North Korea’s artillery targeting South Korean cities, its navy torpedoing South
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Korean ships, its commandos targeting South Korean leaders, or its nuclear
arsenal threatening South Korean existence itself. With this increase in security,
the ROK could reduce its defence budget from its current $31 billion a year
while also ending mandatory conscription (Terry 158). From an economic
standpoint, conscription limits a nation’s economic growth. The practice
delays young men’s entrance into the workforce and constrains their economic
potential. Furthermore, acquiring North Korea has serious economic advantages.
South Korea’s economy is extremely advanced, but the country must import
ninety-seven percent of its energy, as well as the materials it needs to sustain
its export sector (Terry 157). North Korea has large deposits of coal, uranium,
magnesite, and rare-earth metals, but it has neither the capital nor the technology
to mine them (Terry 157). The technology from the South combined with the
raw materials from the North would give a united Korea a major competitive
advantage. Also, access to the northern half of the peninsula would allow the
ROK to transport goods more efficiently. Currently, South Korea functions as an
island economy, as the hostile DPRK blocks South Korea’s only access to land.
In a united Korea, goods would flow freely from Korea to China and Russia,
reducing both importing and exporting costs, since companies use more efficient
methods to ship by land. The benefits of a larger labour base, more natural
resources, and additional territory would lead to a huge overall economic boost
for Korea in the long term.
As a democracy, public opinion is important in the ROK and prounification sentiment is becoming rarer in South Korea. There is growing
indifference, doubt, and even opposition to reunification among South Koreans.
Seven decades have passed since the dividing of Korea. Most South Koreans
have never experienced a united Korea, and many do not have any personal
connections with anyone in the DPRK. Among teens, the number of those who
support reunification has dropped to twenty percent (Phillips). Many South
Koreans feel that they now have nothing in common with those who live in the
DPRK because the two Koreas have so dramatically diverged. The ROK needs
to make a stronger case for reunification to its citizens, especially its youth, if the
process is to succeed. North Korean popular opinion towards unification is more
difficult to determine. Citizens of the DPRK have no way of relaying their true
opinions to the outside world. DPRK defectors are not necessarily representative
of what the rest of the population truly feels regarding reunification because they
are all men and women who hated the DPRK enough to risk their lives trying
escape.
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V. Lessons for the Future
It is unlikely that the Kim regime will come to a clean end. The
process of reconstructing North Korea, politically and economically, will be
tremendously difficult. However, the ROK and its allies have the benefit of
history. By applying lessons learned from the aftermath of the German and
Vietnamese reunifications, as well as the collapse of the USSR and the eastern
Bloc, a united Korea could continue the ROK’s legacy of success.
After the collapse of the USSR, economic reforms during the 1990’s in
the former Soviet empire were not handled efficiently. Mass privatization by
new regimes, known as “shock therapy,” resulted in heavy unemployment, as
well as discontent with the new system (Kirschbaum). The breakdown of the
trade networks within the communist world forced countries to integrate quickly
into the capitalist world economy. As a result, the GDR (once the Eastern
Bloc’s leading industrial nation) is now largely devoid of industry. Often state
enterprises were promptly shut down and sold rather than being retooled and
run for the long-term benefit of the state (Kirschbaum). Additionally, many
former GDR residents feel that beneficial organizations and programs, such
as the twelve-year school system and pre-school care, were ended for purely
ideological reasons (Kirschbaum). The transition from a centrally planned
economy to a competitive market economy is not easy. ROK would be wise to
learn from the consequences of rushing economic reforms and take the necessary
time to integrate the former DPRK into the modern, globalized world.
After the French withdrew from their colonies in Southeast Asia,
Vietnam was divided in two by the 1954 Geneva Accords. America backed the
new country of Southern Vietnam and poured economic aid and investment
into the nation. As a result, South Vietnam become financially better off than its
northern counterpart. In the aftermath of North Vietnam’s victory over South
Vietnam, massive amounts of North Vietnamese moved to the wealthier south.
This migration caused the South Vietnamese economy to collapse, creating a
period of economic decline for the entire country (“Vietnam – Migration”).
South Korea would do well to learn from the repercussions of Vietnam’s
unification by maintaining strict border controls along the Demilitarized Zone
in order to prevent an influx of people moving from North to South in Korea.
Forbidding North Koreans from moving to South Korea, while unpopular
amongst the former citizens of the DRPK, would be necessary for a substantial
period of time to allow both halves of Korea to adjust to the new reality. It would
be in the best interests of the Korean people as a whole to rebuild Northern
Korea first because South Korea’s supply of available housing and employment
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opportunities would never be able to keep up with North Korean demand.
In conclusion, this paper has shown that the unification of Korea will
not come about with ease. Though the DPRK is susceptible to collapse, the
militarized and desperate Kim dynasty will not dissolve without firing a shot.
The DPRK leadership have committed horrendous crimes and would certainly
be put on trial in front of the International Criminal Court if they ever lost power.
While the collapse of the DPRK would cause short-term regional instability,
a ‘hard landing’ is the most optimal scenario for Korean reunification. With
preparation and planning, combined with the broad support of the international
community and East Asia’s regional powers, the DPRK can be successfully
integrated into the ROK. Reunification is in the best interest of South Korea,
Japan, China, and the US. In the end, those who stand to gain the most from this
outcome are the North Koreans themselves, finally able to escape from MarxistLeninist totalitarianism. Free from a world of labour camps, hardship, and
repression where conditions are among the worst in the world, those who live in
the DPRK could, for the first time in their lives, look towards the future with true
hope.
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